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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Civil Rights-Title VII and the Duty to Accommodate Religious
Practices: Toward a Stricter Standard?-Discrimination in employment on
the basis of religion was prohibited by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.1 To facilitate enforcement of the provisions of the Act, Congress created
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 2 (EEOC) and empowered
it, among other things, to issue guidelines for employers' responses to the
3
religious needs of employees and potential employees.
The EEOC's original set of guidelines, 4 issued in 1966, did not usually
require an employer to make accommodations for his employees' religious
needs, 5 and an employee could not demand such accommodations "absent an
"6
intent on the part of the employer to discriminate on religious grounds ...
7
The current guidelines, first established by the EEOC in 1967, were designed
to increase the employer's responsibility. The revised standards abandoned
the intent test in favor of an affirmative duty of accommodation to the
employee's religious needs. 8 Several courts nullified the affirmative duty of
accommodation standard, 9 finding that the EEOC test exceeded "the Congressional mandate as set forth in [the Civil Rights Act of 1964]."'0
In response to this judicial resistance" 1 Congress amended Title VII by
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970).
Section 2000e-2(a) of the Act states: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to
limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin." Id. § 2000e-2(a) (Supp. II, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
2. Id. § 2000e-4 (Supp. II, 1972).
3. Id. § 2000e-12 (1970).
4. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 31 Fed. Reg. 8370 (1966).
5. The guidelines did suggest that an employer "make a reasonable accommodation to the
needs of his employees.., in connection with special religious holiday observances." Id § 1605.1
(b)(2).
6. Id. § 1605. 1(b)(3) (emphasis added).
7. Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Religion, 29 C.F R. § 1605.1 (1975), effective
July 13, 1967.
8. Id. The guidelines require "the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such accommodations can be made
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 1605.1(b). The
guidelines further state that "the employer has the burden of proving that an undue hardship
renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the employee unreasonable." Id. §
1605.1(c).
9. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 n.l (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam); Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892,
895 (E.D. Ark. 1972) (mem.).
10. Kettell v. Johnson & Johnson, 337 F. Supp. 892, 895 (E.D. Ark 1972) (mem.).
11. 118 Cong. Rec. 705-14 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph, sponsor of the amendment,
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enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 197212 which incorporated the EEOC's standard by providing:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as
belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate
to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.1 3
Although this standard has been challenged as violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment, its constitutionality has been upheld by
the two circuits which have examined the issue. 14 Thus, despite continuing
criticism of the standard on constitutional grounds,'s the duty to reasonably
explaining the need for the amendment, including the necessity to clarify the issue left open by
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court,
402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam)).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Supp. II, 1972).
13. Id. § 2000e(j) (Supp. II, 1972) (emphasis added).
14. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33, 43-44 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
97 S. Ct. 381 (1976); Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 551-54 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd by
an equally divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976) (per curiam).
The Sixth Circuit in Cummins examined whether the 1972 amendment and the EEOC
regulations were violative of the establishment clause of the first amendment of the Constitution
by using the three-fold test established by the Supreme Court in Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). The court noted that in order to satisfy the establishment clause
Nyquist required that the statute "(1) 'must reflect a clearly secular legislative purpose,' (2) 'must
have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion,' and (3) 'must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion.' " 516 F.2d at 551-52. The court stated that the
prevention of discrimination was clearly the secular legislative purpose of the legislation.
Secondly, the court found that the primary effect of the legislation was "to inhibit discrimination,
not to advance religion." Id. at 553. Thirdly, the court noted that the legislation "require[d] little
or no contact between religious institutions and governmental entities." Id. The Sixth Circuit
cited the Sunday closing law cases, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), as further
support for the constitutionality of this legislation. The court reasoned that if laws requiring an
employer to refrain completely from operating his business were not violative of the establishment
clause then the legislation requiring an affirmative duty of accommodation, which was actually
less restrictive to the employer, must, a fortiori, be constitutional. 516 F.2d at 554.
The Eighth Circuit, in Hardison, adopted completely the reasoning set forth in Cummins, and
also found the legislation to be constitutional. 527 F.2d at 43-44. Contra, Yott v. North American
Rockwell Corp., No. 71-1418-R (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 1977).
15. 62 Va. L. Rev. 237 (1976); 51 Notre Dame Law. 481 (1976). The authors of both these
casenotes reached a conclusion contrary to those of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits. Using the
three-step Nyquist test they conclude that the legislation fails the "primary effect" test by
conferring only on certain employees, special benefits which are not essential to an employee's
first amendment right to free exercise of religion. Id. at 491. The legislation not having a neutral
effect on religion is, therefore, violative of the establishment clause. Recently, a district court
relied on this approach to hold § 2000e(j) unconstitutional. Yott v. North American Rockwell
Corp., No. 71-1418-R (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 1977).
It is apparent that the Supreme Court desires to resolve many of the issues discussed above.
The Court granted certiorari in Hardison less than two weeks after splitting four-four in
Cummins. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted 97
S. Ct. 381 (1976). It should be noted that on the same day it denied review in Reid v. Memphis
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accommodate an employee's religious needs remains a reality with which an
employer must contend.
Since Congress chose to adopt a standard of reasonableness, precise rules of
law outlining the duty of an employer in religious discrimination cases are not
possible. Instead, the decisions must be based on the court's assessment of the
reasonableness of the employer's actions in view of the facts peculiar to each
case. Nevertheless, an examination of three recent decisions' 6 clearly indicates
a trend toward holding employers to an increasingly strict standard in
accommodating their employees' religious needs. The present discussion will
compare these decisions, in which the courts found a breach of the employer'sduty to accommodate, with the rulings in earlier cases, where similar
conduct was held to create undue hardship which relieved the employer of
this duty. It will also examine the recently expanded application of the
doctrine of accommodation.
In Draperv. United States Pipe & Foundry Co. '7 the plaintiff, a member
of the Worldwide Church of God, was discharged by his employer for his
unexcused absence from work for four consecutive Saturdays. One of the
tenets of the plaintiffs religion was that he refrain from all work during his
Sabbath-from sundown on Friday through sundown on Saturday. When it
first became apparent that there would be a conflict between the plaintiffs
work schedule and his religious beliefs, he brought this fact to the attention of
his supervisor. At first it was agreed that the plaintiff should seek other
employment that would not conflict with his Sabbath observance. To assist
Draper in his search for a new job the employer excused him from eight
Friday night assignments. Plaintiff, however, decided to remain in the employ
of the defendant. To decrease the likelihood of plaintiff's working on his
Sabbath the employer then transferred Draper to the day shift. However,
Draper was informed that if production increased and it became necessary for
that shift to work on Saturday he would be expected to do so. The employer
suggested, therefore, that plaintiff transfer to a different job within the
company where the likelihood of his working on the Sabbath would be
remote.
The employer also offered to work out an arrangement with the union to
give Draper "super seniority" in that new position to assure his choice of
shifts. Draper rejected this suggestion since the proposed new position paid
lower wages and would not have allowed him to utilize his skill and training
as an electrician. 18 A few months later the employer did increase production
Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 394 (1976). and Williams v
Southern Union Gas Co., 12 F.E.P. Cas. 5 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976),
thus suggesting that the Court will attempt to settle a number of issues in this area by its opinion
in Hardison.
16. Cooper v. General Dynamics, 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub
nom. Machinists v. Hopkins, 45 U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537); Draper v.
United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Hardison v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
17. 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
18. The plaintiff was a skilled electrician with twelve years of experience. Among his duties
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and informed the plaintiff that he was required to work on Saturdays. When
Draper was subsequently discharged for failure to report to work on four
consecutive Saturdays, he brought suit against the employer under Title VII.
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's findings that the
and that further accomemployer had attempted reasonable accommodation
19
modation would have been an undue hardship.
Defendant submitted that its offer to transfer Draper to a new position
constituted a valid attempt to accommodate. 20 Prior to Draper an offer to
transfer an employee had appeared to be an acceptable method of accommodation. Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co."-established that,
at least when the employee requested a transfer for religious reasons, "[it is
the employer's duty to seek out

. . .

an open position within its organization

before it can discharge an employee based on religious needs." '2 2 In Dixon v.
Omaha Public Power District,23 on facts very similar to Draper, the court
found it an acceptable solution to transfer a skilled electrician to a lower
paying, less skilled position when it became apparent that the employee
would not be able to work on Saturday-his Sabbath.
Draper found the employer's offer to transfer the plaintiff an inadequate
accommodation because he would be receiving lower wages in a position in
which his skills could not be used. 24 "When a transfer adversely affects an
to
employee to this degree, we believe that the employer first must attempt
25
accommodate the employee within his current job classification."
The courts have stated that employers must at times bear some costs in
accommodating their employees' religious needs. 26 However, designing a
was the servicing of the company's production machinery at the end of the work week. When the
plant was in operation between Monday and Thursday the electricians serviced the equipment on
Friday; when the plant was in operation between Monday and Friday the electricians serviced the
equipment on Saturday. Since only the electricians were required to work on Saturdays plaintiff's
employer suggested he switch to a production job where he would not have to work on his
Sabbath. The production job, however, paid less and did not require the skills of an electrician.
19. 527 F.2d at 519. There had been some question as to the Sixth Circuit's position regarding
the affirmative duty to accommodate. See 44 Fordham L Rev. 442, 451-52 (1975). The Sixth
Circuit now appears, however, to be firmly taking a position in favor of the affirmative duty
standard and rejecting the discrimination by intent standard resurrected in Reid v. Memphis
Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 394 (1976). 527 F.2d at 517
n.2. The apparent split in the Sixth Circuit was noted in Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976). However, the Eighth Circuit
declined to follow Reid. 527 F.2d at 38 n.5.
20. 527 F.2d at 519.
21. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
22. Id. at 5. It should be noted that Draper made no such request.
23. 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974). Dixon relied, however, on the subsequently reversed
district court ruling in Hardison. See notes 48-51 infra and accompanying text.
24. 527 F. 2d at 519.
25. Id. (emphasis added). The court's statement fails to accord significance to defendant's
original transfer of the plaintiff within his current job status to a shift less likely to interfere
directly with plaintiff's Sabbath observance.
26. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
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compromise accommodation which would also require some concessions on
the part of the employee would not appear to be in conflict with other
religious freedom cases decided by the Supreme Court.27 Yet Draperappears
to hold that the employer must bear the entire cost of the employee's exercise
of his religious beliefs and practices.
In its defense the employer in Draper also asserted that further accommodation of the plaintiff would have created an undue hardship in the operation of
its business. The employer pointed out that to accommodate Draper without
transferring him would require other employees to rearrange their shifts and
work longer hours to cover for the plaintiff. 28 This, claimed the defendant,
would not only have caused a general loss of morale among the other
30
employees,2 9 but would have endangered the safety of the workers as well.
The defense of employee discontent had previously received some support
in the Sixth Circuit. 3 1 However, Draper makes it clear that such a claim is no
longer a viable excuse:
"The objections and complaints of fellow employees, in and of themselves, do not
constitute undue hardship in the conduct of an employer's business. If employees are
disgruntled because an employer accommodates its work rules to the religious needs of
one employee 32...

such grumbling must yield to the single employee's right to practice

his religion."

The court suggested that only if such "employee discontent will produce
'chaotic personnel problems' -33 would it constitute an undue hardship. It is
highly unlikely that the accommodation of a single employee within any
business, except for those with very few workers, 34 would create "chaos."
Moreover, "chaotic personnel problems" seem an extreme standard by which
to measure a undue hardship. Nonetheless, if Draper is followed most
employers will be precluded from successfully asserting this defense.
In several cases, the defense of health and safety had also been accepted as
a valid reason for not accommodating an employee. In Dixon it was found
that the employees who would have had to replace the accommodated
27.

E.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). The Court noted that Sunday closing

laws did not discriminate against any person wishing to engage in a particular religious practice
but merely "operate[d] so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive." Id. at
605.
28.
29.
30.

527 F.2d at 520.
Id.
Id. at 521.

31.

Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided

court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam), held that a variance of a union contract to allow

accommodation of one employee at the expense of others "would constitute unequal administration of the collective bargaining agreement among the employees, and.. lead to grievances and
additional arbitrations." Id. at 330.
32. 527 F.2d at 520, quoting Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'd
by an equally divided court, 97 S. Ct. 342 (1976) (per curiam).
33. Id.at 521.
34. E.g., Johnson v. United States Postal Service, 364 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. Fla. 1973). aff'd,
497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Drum v. Ware, 7 F.E.P. Cas. 269 (W.D. N.C. 1974).
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employee would be required to work with a "highly dangerous product," i.e.,
electrical transmission lines. Dixon implied that the employer must exercise
"the highest degree of care and efficiency" toward these other employees, as
well as to the general public. 3 - Consequently, Dixon suggested that these
36
potential hazards excused the employer from providing the accommodation.
In Draper the record indicated that the employees who would have had to
substitute for the plaintiff would have been subjected to continuous work for
37
up to sixteen hours with highly "sophisticated and dangerous" equipment.
The employer also presented evidence that such long periods of work created
unsafe working conditions. 3" The district court agreed that this evidence
justified the employer's rejection of the accommodation. The Sixth Circuit,
however, found the conclusion "clearly erroneous. '39 The court first noted
"that safety considerations are highly relevant in determining whether a
proposed accommodation would produce an undue hardship on the employer's business."'40 The court, however, hypothesized that an accommodation
requiring substitute workers to be on the job for only ten to fourteen hours
could have been arranged. 4 1 The court concluded that the employer had "not
proved that accommodation
would have caused safety problems amounting to
'42
undue hardship.
The Sixth Circuit's decision was predicated on a policy of requiring
an actual attempted accommodation:
[W]e are somewhat skeptical of hypothetical hardships that an employer thinks might
be caused by an accommodation that never has been put into practice. The employer is
on stronger ground when he has attempted 4various
methods of accommodation and can
3
point to hardships that actually resulted.

In general, a requirement that the employer demonstrate some actual
hardship may indeed be effective to prevent employers from circumventing
the EEOC guidelines by claiming phantom hardships to justify nonaccommodation. Yet it is questionable whether this requirement should be
used, as in Draper, to override a defendant's claim of hardship due to health
and safety hazards to plaintiff's co-workers. Unfortunately, Draper could
35.

385 F. Supp. at 1386.

36. Id. at 1387. Accord, United States v. Albuquerque, 10 F.E.P. Cas. 771, 779 (D.N.M.
1975), aff'd, 545 F.2d 1107 (10th Cir. 1976).
37. 527 F.2d at 521.
38. Id. at 521-22.
39. Id. at 519.
40. Id. at 521.
41. Id.
42. Id.at 522.
43. Id.at 520 (emphasis added). The court, however, noted that it might be "possible for an
employer to prove undue hardship without actually having undertaken any of the possible
accommodations ...."Id. However, the method of rejection of the employer's position indicates
that employers will have a very difficult burden in proving their claims without an actual
attempt. Employers with very few workers would have the best chance of substantiating
hypothetical hardships because smaller businesses commonly lack the financial resources necessary to sustain the hardship should it actually occur. See note 34 supra.
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result in employers' exposing their employees to significant health and safety
risks in order to justify to the court an ultimate refusal to accept such an
accommodation. The result in Draper is all the more striking because in
reaching its decision the court reversed the district court's finding of fact.
Such findings are ordinarily not to be disturbed unless they are "clearly
erroneous."'' This standard is rigorously observed when the findings are
based upon oral evidence. 45 Yet the circuit court concluded that the district
46
court's findings, based upon testimony at trial, were "clearly erroneous.
The court supported its ruling by hypothesizing an accommodation whereby
the plaintiffs fellow employees would have had to work fourteen hour shifts
rather than the sixteen hour shifts projected by the district court. 47 Even
conceding the practicability of the circuit court's hypothetical solution, it is
certainly arguable whether the two hour differential suggested by that court
would materially lessen the danger posed to the plaintiff's co-workers by such
an accommodation. Thus, the propriety of the reversal of the district court
decision as "clearly erroneous" seems doubtful.
The Eighth Circuit in Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.' 8 further
restricted the scope of employer defenses to employee charges of a breach of
the duty to accommodate. In Hardison the plaintiff, a member of the
Worldwide Church of God, observed a Friday night through Saturday night
Sabbath. For a time plaintiff had been able to observe his Sabbath by
working the night shift. However, after marrying, he transferred to a different section in order to work during the day. As a result of this transfer
plaintiff was placed in a position of extremely low seniority in the new
section. Shortly after changing sections, plaintiff, by reason of his low
seniority, was ordered to substitute for another employee who was on
vacation and whose work schedule included Friday evening and Saturday
assignments. Plaintiff informed both his employer and his union representative of the conflict with his religious beliefs, and discussed with them a
number of possible solutions. 49 The plaintiff rejected these solutions because
they would not have completely insured him against working on his Sabbath.
When plaintiff failed to report to his assigned shift for the next three
Saturdays and the following Friday evening, TWA discharged him for
insubordination. Plaintiff brought suit under Title VII against both TWA and
the union. The district court s found for the defendants, holding that TWA
had fulfilled its duty of accommodation. The Court of Appeals reversed as to
TWA and affirmed as to the union.5"
44. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
45. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 810 (1950).
46. 527 F.2d at 519. But see the dissenting opinion of Engel, J., id. at 523-24; Williams v
Southern Union Gas Co., 12 F.E.P. Cas. 5 (10th Cir. 1975), cert denied, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
47.

527 F.2d at 521.

48. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 381 (1976).
49. The possibilities of the plaintiff obtaining new employment, again changing shifts, or
working a four day week were all discussed. However, none were instituted since they each
would have required the plaintiff to work that first Saturday. Id. at 36 & n.3.
50. 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
51.

527 F.2d at 44.
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The Eighth Circuit was very stringent in its interpretation of the employer's
duty to accommodate. It rejected three employer claims of undue hardship
arising from: (1) employee non-cooperation with regard to accommodation; (2)
necessity to pay overtime costs to other workers in order to accommodate an
employee; and (3) employer compliance with a union contract as prohibiting
certain types of accommodation.
Prior to Hardison it had been assumed that an employee would be required
to cooperate with his employer in attempting to reach a workable accommodation. 5 2 This was implicit in Roberts v. Hermitage Cotton Mills'53 assertion
'54
that "[t]he burden [of accommodation] is not on the defendant entirely.
55
And in Fischer v. Alsing the employer was relieved of his liability because
efforts" to accommodate the
the plaintiff had failed to use "reasonable
56
defendant's legitimate business needs.
In Hardison the employer, claiming that if plaintiff had not transferred
sections he would have retained enough seniority to be assured of a work-free
Sabbath, raised the defense of employee non-cooperation.57 The court rejected the contention, holding that limitations on plaintiffs "right of transfer
within the company as a condition of accommodation" ' constituted religious
discrimination. The court further held that "[blefore an employer can assert
the defense of non-cooperation, it is incumbent upon [the employer] to
establish the accommodation which it has tendered and with which the
employee refused to cooperate."5' 9 The court concluded that TWA had made
no offer of accommodation and thus the plaintiff could not be charged with
non-cooperation.
The court appeared to accept non-cooperation by an employee as a valid
defense by an employer for failure to accommodate. By its reasoning, however, the employer must make an explicit offer of accommodation and an
employee's conduct, by itself, prior to the offer of accommodation, does not
constitute non-cooperation. Thus, in Hardison, even though the employee,
not motivated by religious reasons, created a situation which he realized
would probably result in a60conflict with his employer, the employee was not
considered uncooperative.
The court next rejected defendant's claim that further accommodation
would have caused undue hardship to TWA resulting from overtime costs.
52.

See Note, Religious Discrimination in Employment: The 1972 Amendment-A Perspec-

tive, 3 Fordham Urban L.J. 327, 339 (1975).
53. 8 F.E.P. Cas. 315 (D.S.C. 1973), aff'd, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 319 (4th Cir. 1974).
54. Id.at 317.
55. 7 F.E.P. Cas. 220 (D. Ore. 1974).
56. Id.at 221.
57. 527 F.2d at 39.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. This is not to imply that the employer in this case should have been excused for an
outright discharge of the plaintiff. In such a situation the employer should offer an accommodation that would enable the employee to return to his prior position. If the employee refuses, then
the employer should have the defense of non-cooperation.
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Prior to Hardison, overtime costs had been accepted as an undue hardship
which relieved the employer of his duty to accommodate. In Dixon the court
found that requiring an employer to pay significant additional overtime to
those employees who would have had to substitute for the accommodated
employee constituted undue hardship. 6' More recently the Sixth Circuit in
Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co. 62 held that while overtime costs do not
constitute undue hardship per se, the amount of overtime that the 63employer
would have had to pay in that case did create undue hardship.
The district court in Hardison stated:
To replace [the plaintiff] with an employee who was not regularly scheduled to work at
that time would have caused TWA to pay premium wages. [This] . . .would have

created an undue burden on the conduct of TWA's business. Title VII cannot be
interpreted to require that companies finance employee's religious beliefs.6r
The circuit court's decision in Hardison clearly rejected the position that
overtime costs alone establish an undue hardship. "The regulation does not
preclude some cost to the employer anymore than it precludes
some degree of
65
inconvenience to effect a reasonable accommodation.1
Excessive overtime costs may still qualify as an undue hardship. 66 After
Draper, however, proof of actual hardship rather than projected losses may
be required of the employer. 6 7 Furthermore, the employer may well have to
prove that paying overtime was the only method available to secure a
substitute for the accommodated employee.
Finally, Hardison addressed the issue of whether a valid union contract
could act as a limitation upon the employer's duty to accommodate. This
question was first raised in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co. 68 In Dewey the
Sixth Circuit stated that an employer was not obligated to seek modification
of a valid union contract in order to accommodate an employee since to do so
would create an undue hardship. 69 Dawson v. Mizell 70 followed this reasoning. It held that violation of the union seniority system to accommodate the
employee would impose an undue hardship. 71 The basis for these rulings is
61. 385 F. Supp. at 1386. The court did not suggest the amount of overtime costs involved in
this case.
62. 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 394 (1976). For a criticism of this case
see note 19 supra.
63. 521 F.2d at 516, 521. To accommodate the employee the defendant would have had to
expend $77 a day in overtime. Id.
64. 375 F. Supp. 877, 891 (W.D. Mo. 1974) (emphasis added).
65. 527 F.2d at 40.
66. Whether overtime costs will constitute undue hardship will probably depend upon two
factors: the actual costs involved and the size of the business. See notes 34 & 43 supra.
67. 527 F.2d at 40-41.
68. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per
curiam).
69. Id. at 330. See note 31 supra.
70. 325 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1971).
71. Id. at 513. See also Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of
Arbitration Under Title Vii, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 599, 633-34, 638-40 (1971). But see Shaffield v.
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found in Title VII itself which provides the employer some
leeway when he is
72
forced into conflict with a bona fide seniority system.
Hardison recognized the flexibility granted by Congress, but stated:
It would seem that a collective bargaining agreement, the seniority provisions of which
preclude any reasonable accommodation for religious observances by employees, is
prima facie evidence of union and employer culpability under the Act."
Thus, when the employer is presented with a request to accommodate an
employee, a union agreement apparently preventing such accommodation
may no longer be considered an undue hardship. The employer may be
required to seek a variance from the union
agreement in order to fulfill his
74
duty of accommodation to the employee.
Hardison raised the prospect of having unions, in some instances, share
with the employer the responsibility of accommodating the employee. The
Eighth Circuit, in dictum, suggested that a union's failure to work with an
employer could result in union liability. 75 The Fifth Circuit reached the same
conclusion in Cooper v. General Dynamics. 76 It held that the union, as well as
the employer, was under a duty to accommodate. 7 7 The court reasoned that
the language of Title VH178 imposed "a duty on the union's part not to
interfere with an employer's attempt to accommodate under [the 1972
Amendment]. ' 79 Thus an employer may be able to shift the burden of
accommodation by offering a good faith solution, which, if blocked by the
union, may then be argued as a defense for the employer's failure to
accommodate.
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., 373 F. Supp. 937, 942 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v.
Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1, 6 (D. Ore. 1973).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). The Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in pertinent part:
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to apply . . . different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . . provided that such differences are not the
result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin....."
Id.
73. 527 F.2d at 41.
74. Id.at 42.
75. Id. at 42-43. The issue of union liability, though neither argued nor briefed on appeal,
was commented on by the court. In dictum, the court stated: "[I]n a proper case (a] union may be
held to a duty of reasonable accommodation as well as the employer ....
Thus, the union may be
held liable if it purposefully acts or refuses to act in a manner which prevents or obstructs a
reasonable accommodation by the employer so as to cause the employer to discriminate." Id. at
42. See notes 77-79 infra and accompanying text.
76. 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Machinists v. Hopkins, 45
U.S.L.W. 3351 (U.S. Oct. 18, 1976) (No. 76-537).
77. Id. at 170-71 & n.15; id. at 171-72 & n.1 (Brown, C.J., specially concurring).
78. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor organization . . . to cause or
attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(3) (1970).
79. 533 F.2d at 171 n.15 (emphasis in original). See text at note 13 supra for the text of the
1972 Amendment. Thus, Cooper reached a holding which the dictum in Hardison had suggested.
See note 75 supra.
The court in Cooper was split, however, on the issue of whether hardship upon the union must
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However, by its recognition that the duty of accommodation encompasses
"all aspects of religious observance and practice," 80 Cooper may have an even
greater impact upon employer-employee relations. There, for the first time, a
circuit court enforced the employer's duty to accommodate his employees'
religious beliefs concerning a matter beyond religious holiday and sabbath
observances.
The two plaintiffs in Cooper were members of the Seventh Day Adventist
Church, which strongly opposed membership in, or financial support of, labor
unions.8 1 Both plaintiffs had worked for the employer for a number of years
without being members of the union. 8 2 In 1972 the union and the employer
entered a collective bargaining agreement which provided for an "agency
shop."'8 3 Under an agency shop agreement union membership is not mandated, but employees are required to pay all union dues and initiation fees as
a condition of continued employment. 8 4 The agreement conflicted with the
plaintiffs' professed religious beliefs. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully protested their
inclusion within the agency shop agreement and challenged the mandated
dues payment as violative of Title VII.8 5 The district court found for the
employer, holding that plaintiffs' beliefs were illogical and, thus, accommodation was not required. The Fifth Circuit reversed.8 6
Until the appellate court's ruling in Cooper, the duty of an employee to pay
union dues under an agency shop contract 7 appeared to be settled law. In
be considered in determining the question of employer accommodation. S33 F.2d at 170-71. The
majority view, as expressed by Brown, C.J., in his specially concurring opinion, was that
by holding both the employer and the union to a duty of accommodation, each necessarily had the
excuse of undue hardship. Id. at 171-72. "Congress could not have thought that for two parties
under the same stringent substantive prohibition one has an escape hatch of undue hardship
denied to the other growing out of the common industrial setting." Id. at 172. In conclusion the
court stated: "The Union should therefore have the right--equally with the employer--to
demonstrate if it can that the practice condemned cannot be avoided without undue hardship to
its legislatively ordained role." Id. at 173.
Thus, at times, the union and the employer have a joint duty. It is important that the employer
be aware of the union's potential liability in attempting to accommodate his employees.
80. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (Supp. I1, 1972).
81. "[IThe Seventh Day Adventist Church maintains a long-established doctrine that joining
or financially supporting a labor union is an act inconsistent with the commandment to love one's
neighbor, the employer . . . ." 533 F.2d at 166.
82. Id. at 165. Both plaintiffs had once belonged to the union but had withdrawn on religious
grounds years before the instant problem arose. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 165 n.2.
85. Id. at 165. The plaintiffs brought suit against the employer, and the employer sued the
union to recover the cost of attorney fees expended in defending this action. This latter point
raised the issue of union liability and its duty to accommodate under the Act. See notes 75-79
supra and accompanying text.
86. 533 F.2d at 165.
87. This situation is difficult for the employer because he is caught between seemingly
conflicting legal duties to the employee and the union. He has a duty to the union under the
contract to see that all employees pay dues to the union. Yet at the same time he has, as shall be
seen, a duty of accommodation to the employee.
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Linscott v. Millers Falls Co. 88 the First Circuit held, on facts very similar to
those in Cooper, that an employee's claim of freedom of religion did not
excuse his payment of union dues.8 9 The court reasoned that the congressionally supported principle of the union shop sufficiently counterbalanced the plaintiff's asserted first amendment rights. 90 The Fifth Circuit had
reached the same conclusion in Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.91 where
the court held that the requirement of paying union dues did not mandate the
plaintiff to subscribe to any tenet of unionism, but merely demanded
a
92
contribution toward the cost of the collective bargaining agreement.
The possibility that the standard of reasonable accommodation could be
used to circumvent these firmly established rulings first appeared in Yott v.
North American Rockwell Corp.93 There the Ninth Circuit recognized that an
employer had a duty under Title VII to accommodate an employee
who
94
claimed that paying union dues violated her religious beliefs.
Cooper likewise held that a refusal by an employee to pay union dues came
within the scope of Title VII, and noted: "If the employee's conduct is
religiously motivated, his employer must tolerate it unless doing so would
cause undue hardship to the conduct of his business."9 5 Yott, however, had
held only that the question of accommodation would have to be dealt with by
the district court on remand. 96 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit suggested that in
the factual situation at bar the district court could find that the accommodation was not possible. 97 This resulted from the circuit court's conclusion that
plaintiffs religious beliefs, though sincere, were illogical. 98 In Cooper the
Fifth Circuit reversed on that very point, holding it error to consider whether
88. 440 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971).
89. Id. at 18.
90. Id.
91. 429 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971).
92. Id. at 1072.
93. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974). Although not discussed in terms of Title VII, the issue of
accommodation and undue hardship was noted in Linscott, 440 F.2d at 18 n.3. The Llnscott
court, relying upon Dewey, took notice that such an accommodation would have a disruptive
effect upon the other employees and would implicitly be an undue hardship upon the employer.
Id.This approach is no longer valid. See notes 32-34 supra and accompanying text.
94. 501 F.2d at 403.
95. 533 F.2d at 168.
96. 501 F.2d at 403.
97. Id. at 402 n.6. The note states: "We are certain that the [district] court will keep in mind
that the purpose of a union security clause is to insure that all who receive the benefits of the
collective bargaining agreement pay their fair share. 'Free riders' are discouraged. In effect
stability is promoted by reducing potential labor strife, thus increasing the efficient operation of
the business." Id.
On remand, however, the lower court ruled for the defendant after finding § 2000e0)
unconstitutional in violation of the establishment clause, No. 71-1418-R (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10,
1977). See notes 14-15 supra and accompanying text. The district court also filed a supplementary
opinion, however, in which it found that all suggested accommodations in the case would place
an undue hardship on the employer. No. CV 71-1418-R (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 10, 1977).
98. 501 F.2d at 403 n.7.
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the plaintiffs' beliefs were irrational. 99 The Fifth Circuit stated that the only
issues the district court should have determined were whether plaintiffs'
beliefs were sincerely held and whether they could be accommodated. 0 0
Cooper did not limit its discussion to the question of union dues. It stated:
"[A]l forms and aspects of religion, however eccentric, are protected except
those that cannot be, in practice and with honest effort, reconciled with a
businesslike operation."'' ° This statement should alert employers to possible
demands for accommodation as to other matters which have long been
considered settled,10 2 as well as to questions heretofore unlitigated.
Viewed as a whole these cases clearly indicate that employers will have to
be more flexible in accommodating their employees than they have been in the
past. The defense of undue hardship appears to have been limited. Employers
will have difficulty in claiming that adverse employee reactions, overtime
costs, or violations of valid union contracts constitute undue hardship excusing accommodation. Furthermore, employers may be faced with demands
that go beyond mere requests for time off for Sabbaths or religious holidays.
Most significant is the circuit courts' insistence upon proof of actual hardships. To satisfy their duty to accommodate, employers may be required to
prove that0 3their attempts at accommodation have in fact resulted in undue
hardship. 1
Joseph 1. Loonan
Constitutional Law-Establishment Clause-Supreme Court Upholds Direct
Noncategorical Grants to Church-affiliated Colleges-In 1971, the Maryland
General Assembly enacted legislation to provide aid to private institutions of
higher education.' Church-affiliated colleges and universities which satisfied
the statutory requirements 2 were among those eligible to receive aid under the
99. 533 F.2d at 165, 166 n.4.
100. Id. at 166 n.4.
101. Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added).
102. For example, whether an employer can require male employees to comply with job
related hair grooming requirements in view of Title VII has consistently been decided in the
affirmative. Longo v. Carlisle DeCoppet & Co., 537 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
However, if an employee claims that his appearance is dictated by sincerely held religious beliefs,
under Cooper it appears that the issue of the employer's duty to accommodate will be open to
litigation. Thus, employers will have to be wary of simply refusing to accommodate employee
requests regarding unconventional beliefs or practices. As the court in Cooper said, "all forms...
however eccentric" are to be accommodated. 533 F.2d at 168 (emphasis omitted).
103. See notes 43-47 supra and accompanying text.
1.

Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, §§ 65-69 (1975), as amended, Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, §§ 65,

66, 68 (Cum. Supp. 1976). The 1976 amendments in no way affect the present discussion. See
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I). See text accompanying notes 19, 20, and
34-35 infra.

2. The statute required that each recipient institution (1) be nonprofit and accredited by the
Maryland Department of Education; (2) have been in existence in Maryland prior to July 1. 1970;
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program. The aid was in the form of annual grants made directly to
qualifying colleges and universities. 3 With the exception that the grants could
not be used for "sectarian purposes,"'45 the aid could be put to whatever
purpose the recipient institution chose.
Four Maryland taxpayers 6 filed suit alleging that since approximately
one-third of the aid recipients were church-affiliated institutions, 7 the program violated the first amendment's establishment clause. 8 A divided three(3) maintain one more earned degree programs culminating in associate of arts or baccalaureate
degrees; (4) confer other than merely seminarian or theological degrees. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A,
§ 66 (1975), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976). After the 1974 amendments an applicant was
required to submit "all new programs and major alterations of programs to the Maryland Council
for Higher Education . . . ." Id. The 1976 amendments to this section of the statute require
accreditation by the State Board for Higher Education and submission of applications to this
body "for its review and recommendations regarding their initiation." Md. Ann. Code art, 77A, §
66(c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
3. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 65 (1975), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976).
4. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 68A (1975). This section was added to the Maryland aid
program after the Supreme Court decisions in Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) and
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I). See text accompanying notes 19, 20, and
34-45 infra.
5. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 740 (1976).
6. Id. at 744. In the beginning of the action, two organizations-American Civil Liberties
Union of Maryland and Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and
State-had been dismissed as plaintiffs for lack of standing. Id. at 744 n.8. The action was
brought against the state officials responsible for the program, viz., the Governor, Comptroller,
and Treasurer of the state as well as against the Board of Public Works and five church-affiliated
recipient institutions. Id. at 744 & n.9.
7. Id. at 743. In 1971, the program's first year of operation, seventeen institutions
received aid under the program. Five of these institutions were church-affiliated. In 1972, there
were five church related institutions out of a total of eighteen recipients. These five institutions
were joined as defendants at the commencement of the action in the district court. On appeal to
the Supreme Court, Western Maryland College, a Methodist affiliate was dismissed as a
defendant-appellee. The remaining institutions--College of Notre Dame, Mount Saint Mary's
College, Saint Joseph College, and Loyola College are Roman Catholic affiliates. One, Saint
Joseph College, closed down between the filing of the action and the hearing before the Supreme
Court. It remained a party to the action only with regard to the issue of repayment of funds
received under the program in 1971. Id. at 743-44 & n.10.
8. The first amendment provides in the pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ... ." U.S. Const.
amend. I. It has long been held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8
(1947). This discussion addresses only the main issue before the Court, namely the constitutionality of the Maryland aid program. Two additional issues resolved in the district court were not
appealed. First, the district court found that no public funds could be used for theology courses at
the colleges. The court was unable to determine whether these courses furthered academic or
religious purposes. The court did find, however, that there was a sufficient possibility that aid to
these courses would have the impermissible effect of advancing religion and took steps to insure
that public funds would not be used to support these courses. The Maryland Council, the body
responsible for the administration of the program, and the institutions have complied. The
question was not the subject of a cross-appeal and the Supreme Court expressed no opinion on it.
426 U.S. at 756 n.20. Second, the plaintiff-appellants sought to compel the repayment of money
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judge district court 9 denied all relief. On direct appeal' ° the United States
Supreme Court broke new ground by upholding the constitutionality of direct
noncategorical grants to colleges and universities. Roenzer v. Board of Public
Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976)."

already received by the institutions if the statute were found to be unconstitutional. Relying on
Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon I1), 411 U.S. 192 (1973) the district court ruled against the plaintiffs
on this issue. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1291-92 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd,
426 U.S. 736 (1976). Because the Supreme Court upheld the program it was unnecessary to reach
this question. The Court did note, however, that the ruling of the district court was in keeping
with Lemon. 426 U.S. at 767 n.23.
9. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 736
(1976).
10. Direct appeal from the three-judge district court to the Supreme Court was pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1253 (1970).
11. At the time of hearing before the Supreme Court the Maryland Board of Public Works
was assisted by the Maryland Council for Higher Education (the Council) in operating the aid
program. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 68 (1975), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976). Since that time
the legislature has amended the statute to provide that the functions of these bodies be
administered by the State Board for Higher Education. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A §§ 65. 66, 68
(Cum. Supp. 1976). These amendments do not affect the constitutional principles in the present
discussion nor do they diminish the precedential and instructional value of the Roemer decision.
Prior to the 1976 amendments the Board of Public Works was responsible for approving the
grants made pursuant to the statute. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 68 (1975), as amended, (Cum.
Supp. 1976). The grants are calculated by a statutory formula which has been revised several
times since the inception of the program. Each revision "has resulted in a significant increase in
public aid to the recipient institutions." Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282,
1285 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The amount of aid is presently computed by
multiplying the number of full time students (exclusive of seminarian or theological students)
attending an institution by 15% of the annual allotment made by the state for each full time
student in the public college system. Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 67 (1975); see 426 U.S. at 740.
It was the Maryland Council for Higher Education, however, that was responsibile for the
administration of the program. The Council was a public commission appointed by the Governor.
It had multiple responsibilities in the education field which included the coordinating and
overseeing of state programs in higher education and the submission of reports and recommendations to the proper state authorities. In this capacity the Council had acquired considerable
knowledge with regard to the private colleges in Maryland. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387
F. Supp. 1282, 1285 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). The aid program being discussed
was enacted after a study by the Council which described the precarious financial status of the
state's private colleges. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. at 754 n.19 (1976).
The Council administered the program by performing a bi-level screening process to guarantee
that the funds were properly used. At the first level the Council passed upon an applicant's
eligibility by determining whether the institution "award[ed] only seminarian or theological
degrees." Md. Ann. Code art. 77A, § 66(d) (1975), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1976); see 426 U.S.
at 741-42. Several institutions were excluded at this level. Id. at 742. The Supreme Court noted
that the statute provided that institutions which award "only" theological or seminary degrees be
excluded from the grants, but that the Council had administratively substituted the term
"primarily" for the statutory "only," a change which could conceivably further limit the number
of eligible institutions. Id. at n.3.
At the second level the Council attempted to insure that eligible applicants did not put the
statutory grants to a sectarian use. Id. at 742. While Roemer was pending in the district court,
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Since 1971, the Court has handed down seven major decisions 12 dealing
with the conflict between legislative programs providing for aid to private
education and the proscription of the establishment clause. The two religion
clauses are expressed in absolute terms 13 and the Court has recognized that
they would conflict if carried to a logical extreme. ' 4 To avoid this clash and to
fulfill the mandate of each clause the Court's decisions reflect an effort to
maintain neutrality' 5 between church and state. 16 This requires a case by
the Maryland Council was making this use verification following procedures that It had
developed. Between that time and the hearing in the Supreme Court these procedures were
approved, expanded, and adopted by the Board of Public Works. See Criteria and
Procedures for Aid to Nonpublic Institutions of Higher Education, Maryland Register, Vol. 2,
No. 24, at 1484-86 (Oct. 29, 1975) (hereinafter cited as Criteria and Procedures). The Supreme
Court took judicial notice of these procedures and described them in the plurality opinion. 426
U.S. at 742 n.4. The text of several of the procedures is set out in the Court's opinion. Id. at 743
n.5 and 760 n.22. Basically to receive aid an applicant was required to furnish the Council with
an affidavit by its president which stated that the money would not be put to a sectarian use and
described the planned nonsectarian uses. At the end of the year for which the funds had been
extended, each institution was to submit a report detailing how the funds had been used. This
report was to be certified by the institution's president and accompanied by the president's
personal affidavit stating that the funds were not used for sectarian purposes. In addition, the
recipient institution was required to keep the state funds in a separate account and identify the
aided nonsectarian uses in its budget. The institution's records were to be of " 'sufficient
documentation ... to permit verification by the Council that funds were not spent for sectarian
purposes.' " Id. at 2343, quoting Criteria and Procedures, supra. The Council was required to
attempt to resolve any question of sectarian use from the information supplied by tle above
purposes.' " Id. at 742, quoting Criteria and Procedures, supra. The Council was required to
procedures. Id. at 743. If this was not possible, the Council might have performed a " 'verification of audit [which was to] be conducted with the greatest possible speed and the least possible
disruption of the institution's activities and [also was to] be strictly limited to such information
and data as is necessary to determine whether or not the sectarian usage prohibition has been
violated.' " Id. at 743 n.5, quoting Criteria and Procedures, supra.
12. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (upholding the section of a Pennsylvania program
that provides for the loan of textbooks to students but declaring unconstitutional the program's
other forms of aid, viz., the loaning of instructional equipment to schools and the furnishing of
public school teachers to give remedial courses on the premises of parochial schools); Sloan v.
Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (declaring that a Pennsylvania tuition grant scheme did not pass
constitutional muster); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (striking down
in its entirety New York legislation that called for assistance in the form of building maintenance, tuition reimbursements and tax benefits to parents of nonpublic school children); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (upholding a South Carolina act that assisted in capital construction
through the issuance of revenue bonds); Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ., 413 U.S. 472 (1973)
(declaring unconstitutional New York legislation that reimbursed nonpublic schools for expenses
incurred in performing state mandated services); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
(upholding a federal program of construction grants to colleges and universities while striking
down a twenty year limit on the same); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon I)
(striking down Pennsylvania's "purchase-of-services" program and Rhode Island's program for
supplementing the salaries of nonpublic school teachers).
13. See note 8 supra.
14. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970).
15. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745-46 (1976). In the earliest establish-
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case examination to insure that the narrow path between neutrality and
establishment is maintained. Economic circumstances have contributed to the
number of recent "aid" cases. Private educational institutions, like their
public counterparts, are caught in an inflationary spiral.17 In reponse to this
situation, Congress and many state legislatures have enacted programs designed to help alleviate the fiscal strain.18
The Court has fashioned a tripartite test for determining whether a statute
which provides aid to church-affiliated schools maintains the desired neutrality. The requirements of the test were stated in concise terms by Chief
Justice Burger in Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon 1). 19 To be constitutional,
"[flirst, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its prin-

ment clause case the Court upheld the grant of public aid to Providence Hospital, a Roman
Catholic institution in the District of Columbia. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). The
Court held that the corporation was secular, even though operated by sisters belonging to a
religious order.
The neutrality principle was first enuniciated by the Court when it examined the state aid
program in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947). The New Jersey statute in question
authorized district boards of education to reimburse parents for the cost of transporting their
children to nonpublic schools. Justice Black, writing for the majority in this 5-4 decision, spoke in
sweeping anti-aid language. He proclaimed that neither a state nor the federal government "can
set up a church" or "pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another." Id. at 15. Justice Black continued, quoting with approval the Jeffersonian view: "the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between
church and State.' " Id. at 16. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the aid
program reasoning that a position of neutrality was maintained because the furnishing of
transportation to all children served the public purpose of assuring that children arrive at school
safely and expeditiously. Consequently, the statute was nothing more than a legitimate welfare
program equivalent to sewer maintenance and police and fire protection. Thus any benefit to
religion was incidental. Id. at 17-18.
The Court has returned to this "pupil benefit" theory on several occasions. Meek v. Pittenger,
421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975) (upholding a Pennsylvania textbook loan provision); Board of Educ. v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 241-44 (1968) (upholding a New York law which required local public school
authorities to lend textbooks to nonpublic school students); see 37 Fordham L. Rev. 123 (1968).
16. This has proven to be an arduous task because "[a] system of government that makes
itself felt as pervasively as ours could hardly be expected never to cross paths with the church."
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 745 (1976). In examining the statute before it in
Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon 1), 403 U.S. 602 (1971) the Court articulated the difficulties which it
confronts in fulfilling the mandate of the establishment clause and observed that "[clandor
compels acknowledgement . . . that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation in this
extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law." Id. at 612.
17. Smith, Emerging Consequences of Financing Private Colleges with Public Money, 9
Valparaiso U. L. Rev. 561, 562 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Smith).
18. Id. at 566. For a specific example of one legislature's attempts to devise an aid program
consistent with the strictures of the establishment clause see the Pennsylvania statutes described
and analyzed by the Court in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S.
825 (1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (Lemon 1). The incentive and rationale
behind these programs are often based on promoting the general welfare. Smith, supra note 17, at
567.
19. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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cipal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion
; finally, the statute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "20
The "secular purpose" requirement has been the least troublesome. Although it is essential that this element be satisfied to uphold an aid statute,
there appears to be little room for significant debate concerning its satisfaction
since courts frequently, if not invariably, find a secular legislative purpose. 2 1
By supplying aid to private education and enabling that system to remain
viable, the state provides its citizens the freedom of choosing from a variety of
educational opportunities. 22 In addition, by aiding private institutions 23the
state makes the best use of existing facilities, thus saving tax dollars.
The second part of the tripartite test has undergone some refinement since
its introduction. Writing for the Court in Hunt v. McNair,24 Justice Powell
took the opportunity to distill "primary effect" into two branches. First, an
aid program will have a primary effect of advancing religion if the institution
to which the aid is directed is so sectarian that it is impossible to isolate its
secular functions. 25 Second, "primary effect" would be violated if the state aid
were used to fund a specifically sectarian enterprise in an otherwise secular

20. Id. at 612-13, quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (citations
omitted. The dual requirements---"secular purpose" and "primary effcct"-were applied
in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). It should be noted that Schempp was
not an aid case. Rather the Court examined the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute which
required Bible recitals in public schools. The establishment standards, however, are similarly
applicable. The Court was unable to find a secular legislative purpose, and having determined
that the Bible recitals were of a religious character, the statute was held unconstitutional. Id. at
222-23. Until the addition of "excessive entanglement" in 1970, the purpose and effect requirements constituted the entire establishment clause test. This two-pronged test was applied when
the Court sustained the challenged New York textbook loan law in Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392
U.S. 236 (1968). The Court supported its decision in Allen by a dual rationale, relying not only on
the Schempp test but also reverting back to the "pupil benefit" theory of Everson v. Board of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); see note 15 supra.
21. See notes 17-18 supra and accompanying text. Further illustration was provided In
Roemer. There, the ruling of the district court that the Maryland aid program had a secular
legislative purpose was not raised on appeal. 426 U.S. at 754-55.
22. Smith, supra note 17, at 567. The objective of maintaining diverse educational opportunities has been recognized by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
23. State grants to private schools are miniscule when compared to the expense that the state
would incur in expanding the public system to enable it to absorb the tremendous influx of
students that would result if the private schools priced themselves out of existence. See, e.g.,
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387 F. Supp. 1282, 1285-86 (D. Md. 1974), aff'd, 426 U.S. 736
(1976); Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. Bubb, 379 F. Supp. 872, 888 (D.
Kan. 1974).
24. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). In Hunt, a South Carolina program of assisting in the financing of
capital construction at a Baptist college was challenged. Id. at 735-36. Applying the tripartite test
the Court found the statute constitutional. Id. at 749.
25. Id. at 743.
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setting. 26 To determine if either of these branches of "primary effect" has been
violated a court must examine the character of the recipient institution.
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist27 best illustrates Hunt's refinement. There the Court held unconstitutional New York legislation providing
for aid to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools. The aid was to be
28
to reimburse tuition payused to maintain and repair school facilities,
29
and to provide income tax benefits to the parents of children
ments
attending nonpublic schools. 30 Finding that the institutions eligible to receive
31
the Court held that
benefits under the program were pervasively sectarian,
each type of aid had an unconstitutional primary effect of advancing reli32
gion.

The final part of the tripartite test, "excessive entanglement," was first
enunciated by the Court in Walz v. Tax Commission.33 Chief Justice Burger
indicated that the question of excessive entanglement is one of degree but left
the boundaries of this new requirement rather ambiguous. In the 1971
companion cases of Lemon v. Kurtzman (Lemon J)34 and Tilton v. Richardson35 the Chief Justice did much to clear away the haze that surrounded
"excessive entanglement." These cases indicate that there are also two
branches of the entanglement test. Under the first, an aid program will run
afoul of the Constitution if government is required to become too involved
with religion in details of administration. 36 Under the second, excessive
entanglement would result if the aid program fostered political divisiveness
along religious lines. 37 The Court announced that there are three factors to be
considered when examining an aid statute for excessive entanglement: "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the
26. Id.
27. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
28. Id.at 774-80.
29. Id.at 780-89.
30. Id. at 789-94.
31. Id.at 767-68.
32. Because the Court found the challenged statutes had the unconstitutional effect of
advancing religion, it was not necessary for the Court to consider "excessive entanglement." Id. at
794. In dicta, however, Justice Powell observed that the aid program in Nyquist carried with it a
great potential for fostering political divisiveness. Id. at 794-98; see note 37 infra and accompanying text.
33. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). Interestingly, neither Walz, which added "excessive entanglement" to the tripartite test, nor Schempp, which supplied the first two parts of the test, were
direct aid cases. In Walz, the Court upheld real property tax exemptions granted by New York to
religious organizations. The main thrust of the Court's opinion in upholding the exemptions
seemed anchored in the incidental benefits idea of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
397 U.S. at 676. The true significance of Waz, however, was the introduction of "excessive
entanglement." Id. at 674.
34. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
35. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
36. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
37. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688-89 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
622-24 (1971) (Lemon I).
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aid .that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the
government and the religious authority." 38 It is significant that following the
refinement of "primary effect" in Hunt, the character of the institution must
be examined under both the "primary effect" and the "excessive entanglement" parts of the tripartite test.
Applying the tripartite test and its refinements to the Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island plans challenged in Lemon I, the Court held the statutes unconstitutional. The Rhode Island program provided salary supplements to
the teachers of secular subjects in church-affiliated primary and secondary
schools. 3 9 The Pennsylvania statute authorized the state to reimburse nonpublic schools for actual expenditures for teachers' salaries. 40 To determine if
the statutory plans gave rise to excessive entanglement, the Court examined
them in light of the three factors mentioned above. The Court found that the
schools in question were pervasively sectarian. 4 A primary goal of the school
authorities was to instill in the young and malleable minds of their pupils the
tenets of the affiliated church. Furthermore, the Court found that the
teachers concurred in this purpose and were devoted to its fulfillment.4 2
Turning its attention to the second factor-the form of aid provided by the
state-the Court pointed out that teacher salary supplements were not in
themselves neutral. This was especially so where, as here, it had been
determined that the teachers were devoted to indoctrinating their pupils in the
approved beliefs of the affiliated church. 43 Finally, since the grants were to be
made on an annual basis and were subject to yearly requests for increases,
44
they had the potential of creating political infighting along religious lines.
The majority concluded that an extensive system of surveillance and reporting
would be required in order to insure that the effect of the aid was not to
further religion and that such "prophylactic contacts will involve excessive
and enduring entanglement . . . . 4
In contrast, in Tilton v. Richardson,46 the Court upheld federal construction grants to religiously affiliated colleges. The Court again focused on the
issue of "entanglement." It found that the fundamental objective of these
church-affiliated colleges was to furnish a secular education. Measuring such
elements as the internal discipline of college courses, the principles of academic freedom to which the colleges adhered and the skepticism of college
students which makes them less susceptible to indoctrination than elementary
or high school students, the Court concluded that the grants would not be
used for sectarian purposes. 47 Regarding the form of aid, the Court found that
U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
at 607-09.
at 609-11.
at 616.
at 618-20.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

403
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
403

47.

Id. at 686-88.

at 622-24.
at 619.
U.S. 672 (1971).
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the grants were of a neutral character because the funds were directed toward
the construction of buildings which were easily restricted from sectarian use. 48
Similarly, there was little likelihood of political divisiveness. First, since the
construction grants called for a single contact, it would cause no squabbling
along religious lines. 4 9 Second, the college students were more heterogeneous
than the students attending primary and secondary schools. 50 Combining all
of these factors, the Court found that the resulting relationship between
church and state would not give rise to excessive entanglement. 5 1
In 1975 the Court reaffirmed the use of the tripartite test in Meek v.
Pittenger..5 The Pensylvania statute there considered involved three forms of
aid flowing to nonpublic primary and secondary schools. After applying the
test, the Court found that two of the forms of aid-the loaning of instructional
materials and equipment 53 and the provisions for auxiliary services 54violated the "primary effect" s s and "excessive entanglement"5 6 parts of the
form of aid-textbook loans-test, respectively. The Court upheld the third
7
relying on Board of Education v. Allen.5
"[The law] merely makes available to all children the benefits of a general program to
lend school books free of charge....

[N]o funds or books are furnished to parochial

schools, and the financial benefit is to parents and children, not to schools." 58

It was against this background that the Court in Roemer reviewed the
constitutionality of the Maryland aid program.5 9 The plurality opinion is a
48. Id. at 688. The restriction imposed by the statute prohibited sectarian use of the buildings
for twenty years. The Court stated that it could not permit sectarian use at any time and voided
the time limitation. Id. at 682-84.
49. Id.at 688.
50. Id. at 688-89.
51. Id.
52. 421 U.S. 349, 358-59 (1975).
53. The term "instructional materials and equipment" was defined in the Pennsylvania
statute to include such things as books, periodicals, recordings and projection equipment, tapes,
Id. at 354-55 n.4.
films, slides, etc ....
54. "Auxiliary services" include remedial instruction, guidance counseling, speech and hearing testing and therapy, and the like. Id. at 352-53 n.2.
55. Id. at 363.
56. Id. at 370.
57. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). 421 U.S. at 362. The Court was sharply divided on this point. In his
separate opinion, Justice Brennan expressed the view that "reliance today upon Allen is clearly
misplaced." Id. at 384 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Rather, Justice
Brennan reasoned that the textbook loan provision should also be barred and went so far as to
hint that he would favor the overruling of Allen in light of Lemon and Nyquist. Id. at 378.
58. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 360 (1975), quoting Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S.
236, 243-44 (1968).
59. Justice Blackmun noted that the Court's purpose was "to insure that [the establishment
clause principles governing state aid to church affiliated schools] are faithfully applied in this
case." Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 754 (1976). The faithful application of
these principles, however, yielded a 5-4 decision with five opinions. The decision of the Court
was announced by Justice Blackmun in an opinion in which the Chief Justice and Justice Powell
joined. Id. at 739. A concurring opinion was filed by Justice White with whom Justice
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logical step by step progression down the rungs of the tripartite test. It quickly
deals with the "secular purpose" requirement by accepting the district court's
finding that aid to private colleges provides a financially acceptable alterna60
tive to a completely public system.
Justice Blackmun next examined the "primary effect" requirement. In
accord with the Hunt v. McNair refinement, 6 1 he analyzed the nature,
character and purpose of the appellee institutions to determine first, whether
the institutions were so pervasively sectarian that the secular and sectarian
activities could not be separated and, second, assuming that they could be
separated, whether the aid had been extended to the secular activities alone.
Both questions were answered in favor of the schools. In order to determine if
an institution is so pervasively sectarian as to be barred from state aid, Justice
Blackmun indicated that "it is necessary to paint a general picture of the
institution. ' 6 2 The Court examined the lower court's findings regarding the
colleges' admissions and hiring policies, the existence of voluntary or mandatory participation in religious services, the degree of academic freedom on the
campuses and whether an effort had been made to indoctrinate students in the
affiliated faith. 63 The completed picture demonstrated that the institutions
were not pervasively sectarian.
The Court concluded its "primary effect" investigation by finding that the
second Hunt refinement-that aid be granted only to secular activities-was
fulfilled by the statute's prohibition of sectarian uses and by enforcement of
this prohibition by the Maryland Council of Higher Education. 4
Rehnquist joined. Id. at 767. There were dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan, joined by
Justice Marshall, (id. at 770), Justice Stewart, (id. at 773), and Justice Stevens (id. at 775).
60. This determination by the lower court had not been challenged by either party. It was
therefore not an issue before the Supreme Court. Id. at 754.
61. 413 U.S. 734 (1973). See notes 24-26 supra and accompanying text.
62. 426 U.S. at 758.
63. These criteria are valuable in that they supply guidance as to the eligibility of churchrelated institutions for government funds. They include: (a) Each institution enjoys a high degree
of autonomy. While the Catholic church is represented in their governing boards, the institutions
are neither funded by nor obligated to report to the church. Id. at 755. (b) Spiritual development
is only a secondary objective of the colleges. The only effort made by the institutions to advance
this objective is to supply opportunities for religious experience. Attendance is not required at any
religious service. Id. at 756. (c) There are mandatory theology courses at each institution. These
courses are designed to supplement the overall liberal arts curriculum which is grounded on
principles of academic freedom. Id. The district court, however, was unable to make a finding
regarding the sectarian nature of the theology programs at the four colleges. The possibility that
the courses may be pervasively sectarian prompted the district court to take steps to prevent their
funding. The Roemer Court expressed no opinion on this issue, but did not disturb the district
court's finding. Id. & n.20. (d)There are some religious symbols in the classrooms, some
instructors wear clerical garb, and some classes are begun with prayer. The district court found,
and the Supreme Court agreed, that these matters were peripheral to the question of pervasive
sectarianism and instead treated them " 'as a facet of the instructor's academic freedom.' " Id. at
756. (e) Faculty hiring is on the basis of" 'acadmic quality' " not religious affiliation. Id. at 757.
(f)
The majority of students are Roman Catholic but evidence regarding admissions and recruiting
shows that students are admitted without regard to religion. Id.
64. Id.at 759.
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We must assume that the colleges, and the Council, will exercise their delegated
control over use of the funds in compliance with the statutory, and therefore the
constitutional, mandate. It is to be expected that they will give a wide berth to
"specifically religious activity," and thus minimize constitutional questions. 65
In dealing with the "excessive entanglement" part of the tripartite test,
Justice Blackmun analyzed the three factors first enunciated in Lemon
1.66 With regard to the character of the institution, he referred back
to the conclusion reached under the "primary effect" examination that the
institutions in question were not pervasively sectarian. He reasoned that
ostensibly secular activities "can be taken at face value . . . [and thus t]he
need for close surveillance of purportedly secular activities is correspondingly
reduced."' 67 Therefore, it was not necessary for the state to undertake a
program of extensive and continual surveillance.
Turning to the form of aid, Justice Blackmun indicated that the "process by
which aid is disbursed," 68 and not the particular use of the state grants, was
the issue before the Court. 69 He concluded that this was best explored under
the resulting relationship factor. It is under this factor that the most serious
constitutional difficulties with the aid program appeared. It was here also that
the Court took steps to expand the scope of permissible aid to private higher
education.
The Maryland funding process contemplated annual interchanges between
the church-affiliated colleges and the state. Such contacts, which did not exist
per se in Tilton, are reminiscent of those that led to the voiding of the aid
programs in Lemon I. In Lemon, the aid statute required continuing and
direct contact between church and state. Separate accounting systems were to
be maintained and annual state inspection and evaluation of both school
records and the religious content of programs was necessary to determine the
amount of aid. 7 0 Tilton, however, involved a "one-time, single-purpose
construction grant. 7 1 State invovlvement was limited to the possibility of
72
for secular education.
visits to determine if the facilities were being used
73
The Court found these contacts non-entangling.
65. Id. The Court pointed out that the present challenge was "facial" and that it was not the
practice of the Court "to strike [down legislation) in anticipation that particular applications may
result in unconstitutional use of funds." Id. at 761. In the footnote following the passage quoted
in the text, the Court showed that the Maryland Council was fulfilling its function of seeing that
the funds were not used for sectarian purposes as evidenced by its regulations regarding student
aid, salaries, maintenance and repair, utilities, and capital construction affecting the theology
department. Id. at 760-61 n.22.
66. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
67. 426 U.S. at 762.
68. Id. at 763. (emphasis in original).
69. See note 65 supra.
70. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 620-21 (1971).
71. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
72. Id. at 687. The Court pointed out that these would be minimal contacts "hardly more
than the inspections that States impose over all private schools within the reach of compulsory
education laws." Id.
73. Id.at 688.
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Even assuming that the contacts required by statute for the administration
of a program are not per se entangling, if a system of surveillance would be
necessary to ensure that sectarian use restrictions are respected, excessive
entanglement will result. In Lemon, the statute itself required an extensive
system of surveillance. In Tilton, on the other hand, the form of aid was
neutral and the institutions were pervasively secular. Therefore, surveillance
was not necessary and excessive entanglement did not arise.
Analytically, Roemer falls between Lemon and Tilton. The Maryland
program requires less church-state contact than in Lemon, but more than in
Tilton. Unlike the primary and secondary schools in Lemon, the Roemer
colleges were not pervasively sectarian. Thus, as was the case in Tilton,
extensive surveillance was not necessary. Unlike Tilton, however, the Roemer
program was annual in nature. The appellants urged the Court to recognize
this similarity with the Lemon form of aid and strike down the program. In
the eyes of the Court this was not necessary. First, due to carefully developed
procedures, the administrative contracts were kept to a bare minimum,
limited to decisions by the Maryland Council as to what constituted sectarian
purposes and the possibility of an occasional audit. 74 Second, the plurality

opinion indicates that while the form of aid distinction must be considered, it
is not constitutionally dispositive. 75 Rather, "dominant importance [should be
given] to the character of the aided institutions .... ,,76
Thus, the contacts
necessary under the Maryland program, even though annual in nature, were
determined to be no more entangling than the normal procedures for state
77
accreditations of the colleges.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White, with whom Justice Rehnquist
joined, agreed with the plurality's determination that the primary effect of the
Maryland aid program was not to advance religion. 78 However, he could not
join in the full opinion because he remained loyal to his position that the
''excessive entanglement" branch of the tripartite test is superfluous and
unnecessary. 79 Justice White maintained that
[als long as there is a secular legislative purpose, and as long as the primary effect of
the legislation is neither to advance nor inhibit religion, I see no reason-particularly
in light of the "sparse language of the Establishment Clause,"

constitutional inquiry further. 80

. . .

to take the

74. 764, see note 11 supra.
75. Id.at 764-65.
76. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
77. Id. at 764. The Court went on to discount the possibility of political divisiveness under
this program. Three reasons were listed: first, there is less possibility of divisiveness where as here
the student body is so diverse; second, this program provides aid to all private institutions of
higher education, more than two-thirds of which are not church affiliated; third, the Institutions
in this case enjoy a high degree of autonomy which lessens the likelihood that any controversy
over the aid will involve the Catholic church. Id. at 765-66.
78. Id. at 770 (White J., concurring).
79. Id. at 768-69 (White, J., concurring). See also Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,
413 U.S. 756, 813, 822 (1973) (White, J.,dissenting); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 661,
666 (1971) (Lemon I) (White, J.,concurring).
80. 426 U.S. at 768 (White, J.,concurring) (citation omitted).
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Justice White saw "no reason to indulge in the redundant exercise of evaluating the same facts and findings under a different label"81 and claimed that the
plurality opinion was a demonstration of his criticism. Justice White's position
appears well grounded, especially in light of the dominant importance placed
upon the character of the institution-a factor which enjoys the unique
position of being considered under two different parts of the tripartite test.
Under "primary effect," the Court's finding that the institutions in question
were not pervasively sectarian led to the assumption that the participants in
the aid program would honor the sectarian use restriction. Under "excessive
entanglement," this assumption was used as a basis for finding that it was
unnecessary for the state to undertake a program of surveillance. This
bootstrapping effect lends credence to the criticism leveled by Justice White,
but it seems safe to assume that the tripartite test will enjoy continuing
validity in that seven of the nine justices support it.
Four justices dissented from the holding in Roemer and would have
declared the Maryland aid program unconstitutional. 8 2 Justice Stewart seized
upon the fact that the lower court had been unable to classify the theology
courses at the institutions in question as not pervasively sectarian. This
difference, he stated, was sufficient to distinguish the colleges in Roemer from
those in Tilton. Combining this distinction-that it may be the aim of the
theology courses to deepen religious experience-with the fact that the aid
was in the form of noncategorical grants, he reasoned that the program had
the effect of advancing religion.8 3 Considering the fact that the district court
had taken specific steps to ensure that the theology programs would
receive
84
no funding, Justice Stewart's criticism appears at best, untimely.
Justice Brennan expressed the view that" 'in these instances [the Maryland
program] does in truth offend the Constitution.' "85 From this and other
opinions 86 it seems clear that both Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall are
of the view that any direct state aid to church affiliated institutions will have
81. Id. at 769 (White, J., concurring).
82. See note 59 supra.
83. Id. at 773-75 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
84. An amicus brief submitted to the Court maintained that government funds may be used
to support the academic study of theology. Brief for the Association of American Colleges et al. as
Amicus Curiae at 8-24, Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). These amid
pointed out that while the district court was unable to classify the theology courses as either
academic or sectarian it had found that the appellee colleges were not pervasively sectarian and
enjoyed a high degree of academic freedom. Id. at 7-8. They supported the affirmance of the
judgment below but also urged the Court to sua sponte lift the district court's restriction against
using the aid to fund theology departments or in the alternative "to make an explicit reservation
on the subject of the restriction." Id. at 2. The Roemer plurality did not feel that the possibility of
the theology courses having the effect of deepening religious experience crippled the aid program.
Because it was not the subject of a cross-appeal, however, the Court expressed no opinion on the
contention of the amid. 426 U.S. at 756 & n.20.
85. 426 U.S. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting) quoting, Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 387
F. Supp. 1282, 1298 (D. Md. 1974) (Bryan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 373 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 749 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting);

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

the impermissible effect of advancing religion. 87 Justice Stevens seems to be
similarly disposed. He filed a short three-sentence opinion in which he agreed
with Justice Brennan and sought to emphasize "the pernicious tendency of a
state subsidy to tempt religious schools to compromise their religious mission
without wholly abandoning it."8 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Roemer is both a boon and a bane to the
proponents of government aid to religiously affiliated schools. Prior to Roemer
state aid on the primary and secondary levels was sustained in the form of
textbook loans and in the form of transportation. Aid in the form of funds for
capital construction was sanctioned at the college level. In permitting Maryland to make direct noncategorical grants to church affiliated colleges,
Roemer is the high-water mark of permissible aid.
In light of present economic realities, it is likely that state legislatures will
be encouraged to enact similar legislation. In fact, Roemer has since been
relied on to uphold Missouri's aid program.8 9 On the other hand, by emphasizing the character of the institution, the Court has effectively precluded
elementary and secondary schools from receiving any new form of aid. It
appears that primary and secondary schools will have to abandon their
religious affiliations to be eligible for aid. This dilemma may give rise to the
evil that Justice Stevens feared: that primary and secondary schools may be
tempted to compromise their religious mission in order to receive government
aid. 90
In the course of his opinion, Justice Blackmun, commenting on the number
of recent opinions in this area of constitutional law, noted that "the slate we
write on is anything but clean." 91 Roemer has done little to clean that slate.
While it is clear that noncategorical grants are now constitutional, the haze
which envelops the religion clauses remains. While successive decisions have
whittled away at the more esoteric aspects of earlier pronouncements, there is
still no definitive standard available to the legislatures which will enact or to
courts which will review programs granting state aid to religiously affiliated
schools.
Thomas J. Weber

Constitutional Law-Limits on Judicial Review of Hierarchical Church
Decisions.-A dispute over the control of church property arose when the
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church (the Mother Church),' through its PatriarLemon
Justice
87.
88.
89.

v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 642 (1971) (Lemon I) (separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
Marshall joined Justice Brennan in the Meek and Hunt opinions.
426 U.S. at 770-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. 1976) (en banc), cert. denied, 97 S.

Ct. 653 (1976).

90.

See note 88 supra and accompanying text.

91.

426 U.S. at 754.

1. The administrative, judicial and legislative authority of the Mother Church resides in the
Holy Assembly of Bishops, a body composed of all diocesan bishops and presided over by a
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chate in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, suspended the bishop of its sole diocese in
America and reorganized diocesan territory into three separate dioceses. In an
attempt to circumvent these reorganization plans, the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America and Canada (the Diocese),
under the leadership of the suspended bishop, revised the constitution which
tied it to the Mother Church and declared itself autonomous.' Citing these
acts of open defiance of hierarchical church authority, the Mother Church
indicted, tried and defrocked Bishop Dionisije Milivojevich (the Bishop), who
then sued to enjoin the Mother Church interference with diocesan assets.'
The trial court's award of summary judgment in favor of the Bishop was
reversed by the appellate court. 4 On remand, the trial court upheld the
decision to defrock the Bishop concluding that no substantial evidence had
been produced that fraud, collusion or arbitrariness existed, but the court set
aside the diocesan reorganization as invalid and beyond the power of the
Mother Church. 5 The court adopted the finding that the constitutions of both
Mother Church and
Diocese indicated that the Diocese would retain adminis6
trative autonomy.
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court examined the church constitutions
and penal codes and affirmed the lower court's finding that the reorganization
was beyond the scope of the Mother Church's jurisdiction, but it reversed on
the defrockment
issue on the ground that the defrockment procedure was
7
arbitrary.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the state supreme court on both
grounds. The Court held that the Mother Church was free to formulate and
enforce whatever rules and regulations it deemed appropriate regarding
church discipline and diocesan reorganization and that judicial review of even
bishop designated by the Assembly as Patriarch. For a detailed history of the establishment of the
American-Canadian Diocese and events leading up to the dispute in question, see Serbian Eastern
Orthodox Diocese v. Ocokoljich, 72 Il. App. 2d 444, 219 N.E.2d 343 (1966).
2. The constitution, adopted when the Diocese affiliated with the Mother Church in 1927,
recognized the exclusive authority of the Mother Church to appoint diocesan bishops and approve
subsequent constitutional amendments. Id. at 451, 219 N.E.2d at 347. The by-laws of the
property holding corporation organized under Illinois law in 1945, however, provided that the
diocese was "an autonomous Serbian Church institution" whose property could not be conveyed
by any Serbian Church authority "without the consent and approval of the Diocesan Council,
headed by the Bishop and the Diocesan Church conventions." Id. at 452, 219 N.E.2d at 348.
3. The Bishop's suit in his name and in the name of the two non-profit Illinois corporations
under his control, i.e., the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States of America
and Canada and the Serbian Orthodox Monastery of St. Sava, was consolidated with the
counterclaim for control of diocesan assets filed by the Mother Church. Id. at 453-54, 219 N.E.2d
at 348-49.
4. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Ocokoljich, 72 IIl. App. 2d 444, 219 N.E.2d 343,
appeal denied, 34 Ill.
2d 631 (1966).
5. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. lMilivojevich, No. 63-1644 (Ill. Cir Ct., Dec. 28.
1972) (mem.).
6. Id. The appellate court in its decision to remand had taken this position based on the
pleadings, depositions and affidavits. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Ocokoljich, 72 11.
App. 2d 444, 455, 219 N.E.2d 343, 349, appeal denied, 34 Ill. 2d 631 (1966).
7. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 111. 2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975).
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"arbitrary" decisions of hierarchical judicatories contravened the first and
fourteenth amendments. 8 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
Early state court decisions in cases involving church property disputes
generally either recognized the right of the local majority to control church
property or restricted that right by application of the implied trust doctrine-a
doctrine which viewed church property as held in trust for the furtherance of
the religious tenets, doctrines and government of the church founders. 9
Shortly after the Civil War, the Supreme Court first enunciated guidelines
for resolving church property disputes in Watson v. Jones.' 0 In deciding
whether two local Presbyterian churches in the south were compelled to
follow the anti-slavery position adopted by the highest church judicatory, or
whether they were justified in seceding therefrom, the Court distinguished (a)
property held subject to express provisions of a trust, (b) property held by
congregational churches, and (c) property held by churches subject to hierarchical authority. 1 The Court concluded that civil courts would be bound by
the following rules: (a) express provisions set out in the instrument of
conveyance must be given effect even if it involves the court in an inquiry into
religious doctrine; 2 (b) the will of the majority controls congregational church
property; 13 and (c) the decision of the highest church judicatory would be
binding on churches in a hierarchical structure. 14
8. The Court declined to address the issue of whether marginal court review would exist as to
decisions tainted by "fraud" or "collusion." Serbian Eastern Orthodox Church v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
9. For an analysis of early state decisions in church property disputes, English precedent, and
the implied trust doctrine generally, see Sampen, Civil Courts, Church Property, and Neutral
Principles: A Dissenting View, 75 U. Ill. L.F. 543 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Sampen].
10. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). Watson was a pre-Erie decision which was decided as a
matter of federal common law and before the first amendment was made applicable to the states.
11. Id. at 722-2 7. "The two basic types of internal church structure are congregational and
hierarchical. Under the congregational structure the local church is self-governing and ruled by
simple majority vote. The hierarchical polity is a system of government in which each local
church is subject to the control of a higher ecclesiastical authority. There are at least two kinds of
hierarchical polities: synodical or connectional, in which power is vested in laymen and ministers
through an ascending hierarchy of elected bodies; and episcopal or authoritative, in which power
resides in clerical officers such as bishops or patriarchs and usually emanates from the top. The
Congregational Christian and Baptist Churches furnish examples of the congregational structure,
the Presbyterian Church is the archetype of the connectional form, and the Roman Catholic and
Episcopal Churches are examples of the episcopal type." Sampen, supra note 9, at 546 n.29,
citing Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 Harv. L. Rev.
1142, 1143-44 (1962).
The Court has since defined hierarchical churches "as those organized as a body with other
churches having similar faith and doctrine with a common ruling convocation or ecclesiastical
head." Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 110 (1952).
12. 80 U.S. at 723. Subsequent decisions by the Court have narrowed the scope of permissible
inquiry into religious doctrine which courts may undertake in an attempt to effectuate express
provisions in trust instruments. See note 38 infra.
13. Id.at 725.
14. Id. at 727.
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Finding the churches in Watson within the third category, the Court held
that "the rule of action which should govern the civil courts . . .is, that,
whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which
the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them."' 5
Commencing with Bouldin v. Alexander,16 a year after the Watson decision, a line of cases modified and established exceptions to the Watson rules.
In Bouldin, the Court acknowledged the right of civil courts to scrutinize
church rules and regulations in situations where the church did not follow its
own procedural rules. Bouldin involved a church of congregational polity
whose minority faction had expelled duly elected trustees. In recognizing the
property rights of the expelled trustees, the Court held that "[i]t
may be
conceded that we have no power to revise or question ordinary acts of church
discipline, or of excision from membership. We have only to do with rights of
property.... But we may inquire whether the resolution of expulsion was the
act of the church, or of persons who were not the7 church and who consequently had no right to excommunicate others."'
Court dictum in Gonzalez v. Archbishop 8 provided a further exception to
the Watson rule precluding review of hierarchical church decisions. In approving the Roman Catholic Archbishop's authority to withhold an endowed
chaplaincy from a twelve-year-old heir, the Court concluded that it was the
function of church authorities to determine the essential qualifications of its
officeholders' 9 and suggested that judicial review would 20be available only in
instances involving "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.1
The Gonzalez dictum, accepted as rule of law by commentators2' and lower
courts, 22 was subsequently acknowledged by the Court in Kedroff v. Saint
15.

Id.

16. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
17. Id. at 139-40. Watson, as modified by Bouldin, then allowed federal courts to examine
"church decisions, sometimes rather closely, to ensure that these decisions have been fair and just
to disputing church members, within the context of church doctrine and procedures." Comment,
Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional Considerations. 74 Yale
L.J. 1113, 1118 (1965).
18. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
19. Id. at 16.

20. Id.
21. Bernard, Churches, Members, and the Role of the Courts: Toward a Contractual
Analysis, 51 Notre D. Lawyer 545, 549 (1976) ("Gonzalez extended the scope of review.");
Sampen, supra note 9, at 554 ("The Court never really abandoned Watson, but rather significantly qualified its principles."); Note, Judicial Intervention in Disputes over the Use of Church
Property, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 1142, 1175 (1962) ("[The finality rule] was slightly qualified in a later
dictum.'); Comment, Role of Courts in Church Property Disputes, 38 Mo. L. Rev. 625, 628
(1973) (Gonzalez "indicated that the courts would not acquiese in a dear abuse of ecclesiastical
authority.'); Comment, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitutional
Considerations, 74 Yale L.J. 1113, 1120 (1965) ("Gonzalez v. Archbishop diluted the Watson
principle of absolute deference to church authorities.").
22.

Turbeville v. Morris, 203 S.C. 287, 26 S.E.2d 821 (1943) (Civil courts may review where
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Nicholas Cathedral.2 3 In that case the Court struck down a New York statute
which "provided both for the incorporation and administration of Russian
Orthodox churches" by the American diocese2 4 and thus effectively defeated
the claim of the Patriarch in Moscow to the right of possession of St. Nicholas
Cathedral in New York City. The Court held that the statute contravened the
first amendment and violated the free exercise clause. 25 Citing Gonzalez, the
Court noted that "[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods
of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state
interference. ",26
Later Court decisions eroded the Watson finality rule further by resorting to
"neutral principles" of property law. In Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,27 two local churches
attempted to withdraw from the hierarchical church organization. They
claimed that the general church had departed from the religious tenets held at
the time of their affiliation in violation of an implied trust by which the
general church held title to local property. 28 Under Georgia law, local church
property is held in trust for the benefit of the general church so long as the
general church does not depart from its original doctrine in a fundamental
way. 29 The Court's reversal of a finding for the local churches was not based
charges of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness are involved.); Epperson v. Myers, 58 So. 2d 150
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1952) (Where fraud, collusion or arbitrary conduct is involved the courts will
interfere.).
23. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
24. Id. at 97. "The purpose of the [statute] was to bring all the New York churches, formerly
subject to the administrative jurisdiction of . . . the Patriarch of Moscow, into an administratively autonomous metropolitan district." Id. at 98.
25. Id. at 121. "This holding invalidating legislative action was extended to judicial action in
Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960), where the Court held that the
constitutional guarantees of religious liberty required the reversal of a judgment of the New York
courts which transferred control of St. Nicholas Cathedral from the central governing authority of
the Russian Orthodox Church to the independent Russian Church of America." Presbyterian
Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 448-49
(1969).
26. 344 U.S. at 116. It should be noted that any judicial intervention in religious practices
may raise free exercise questions. "The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between [the
establishment and free exercise clauses] both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other." Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970). See L. Barker & T. Barker, Civil Liberties and the
Constitution, 34-36 (1970). This potential conflict would not seem present in church property
disputes as "courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors" to these
disputes. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440, 449 (1969). This idea is reinforced by the finality afforded hierarchical church decisions.
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 96 S. Ct. 2372, 2387 (1976).
27. 393 U.S. 440 (1969), rev'g 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968).
28. Id.at 442.
29. "Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church
on the sole condition that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at
the time of affiliation by the local churches." Id. at 443.
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on the Watson finality rule, however. 30 Although the Court noted that the
Watson decision had a "clear constitutional ring, '3 1 its decision was limited to
a rejection of the departure-from-doctrine element of the state's implied trust
theory as "not susceptible of the marginal judicial involvement contemplated
in Gonzalez." 32 The Court reasoned that by determining whether the general
church had departed from its original beliefs and whether the extent of the
departure warranted termination of the trust, the lower court would involve
itself unconstitutionally in matters at the "core of a religion. '33 The Court
noted, however, that "[c]ivil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion
merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And
there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes,
which can be applied without 'establishing' churches to which property is
awarded. '34 What the Court meant by neutral principles of law was not
explained until the following year in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the
Churches of God v. Church of God, Inc.3S
The dispute in Maryland & Virginia Eldership involved two local churches
which sought to withdraw from the Eldership. Although the Eldership
36
claimed a hierarchical structure, the state court found for the local churches.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because the lower court in reaching
its decision, had made no inquiry into religious doctrine and had properly
limited its examination to statutory law, deeds, charters and church constitutions. 37 Justice Brennan's concurrence elaborated the various approaches
30. Id. at 446. Although the Court acknowledged that here, as in Watson, a civil court was
asked to impermissibly interfere in ecclesiastical decisions involving a hierarchical church, id. at
445-46, the Court based its reversal of the lower court's finding for the local churches on the
constitutional aspects of the departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust concept. Id. at
449-52.
Had Watson been strictly applied, there would be no room for the state court to enter the
dispute and therefore no reason to remand. On remand, however, the court examined the deeds
and found the legal title to the property in the local churches. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern
Heights Presbyterian Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1041
(1970).
31. 393 U.S. at 446.
32. Id. at 450. The Court noted, however, that "[wle have no occasion in this case to define
or discuss the precise limits of review for 'fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness' within the meaning of
Gonzalez." Id. at n.7.
33. Id.at 450.
34. Id.at 449.
35. 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
36. The initial decision by the state court upheld the autonomy of the local churches and
noted that while the general church was presbyterial or hierarchical insofar as the appointment of
pastors was concerned, the church was congregational in its approach to local church property.
249 Md. 650, 659-60, 241 A.2d 691, 697 (1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 528 (1969). This decision was
vacated on appeal to the Supreme Court so that the Court's decision in Presbyterian Church
would be taken into consideration. On review, the state court again found for the local churches
noting that its prior decision had anticipated that decision in its application of neutral principles
of law and the Court agreed. 254 Md. 162, 254 A.2d 162 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367
(1970).
37. 396 U.S. at 368.
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open to state courts faced with church property disputes. The first approach is
that established by Watson as modified by Gonzalez. States may enforce
property decisions made by a majority of the members of a congregational
church, or by the highest authority in hierarchical churches, unless that
property is held subject to the express terms of a trust or deed, 38 or the
"fraud, collusion or arbitrariness" exception applies. 39 The concurrence specifically noted that the constitutionality of the Watson approach was dependent on a court's ability to first determine the appropriate church governing
body "without extensive inquiry into religious polity. ' 40 The second
approach-neutral principles of law-is that approved by the Court in
Presbyterian Church. Justice Brennan referred to this concept as the formal
title doctrine under which "civil courts can determine ownership by studying
deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws."' 4 1 The third
approach entailed the "passage of special statutes [consistent with Kedroff]
governing church property
arrangements in a manner that precludes state
42
interference in doctrine.
In light of these three approaches, and the additional suggestion that a state
court need not be limited to any one of them, 43 a state court could, in the
absence of a controlling statute, adopt the approach of Watson, Gonzalez and
Kedroff, or the neutral principles of law approach established by Presbyterian
Church and Maryland & Virginia Eldership.44 Thus, the hierarchical finality
rule of Watson was modified to such an extent that the doors of civil courts
were opened to disputes which the Court, a century earlier, had sought to
bar.
The Illinois Supreme Court in arriving at its decision in the Serbian
Eastern Orthodox Church case essentially used both approaches. As to the
defrockment issue, the court applied the Gonzalez exception to the Watson
rule-church decisions may be set aside if arbitrary. 4 5 On the reorganization
issue, the court applied the Maryland & Virginia Eldership principle-neutral
principles of law may be applied in an examination of church polity. The
38. " '[E]xpress terms' cannot be enforced if enforcement is constitutionally impermissible
under Presbyterian Church .... Only express conditions that may be effected without consideration of doctrine are civilly enforceable." Id. at 369 n.2.
39. Civil courts may review those rulings which are alleged to have resulted from "fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness." Id. at n.3.
40. Id.at 370.
41. Id.
42. Id. "Such statutes must be carefully drawn to leave control of ecclesiastical polity, as well
as doctrine, to church governing bodies." Id.
43. Id.at n.4.
44. In addition to the state court approach in the Maryland & Virginia Eldership case (see
note 37 supra), other courts have set aside the Watson approach in favor of a strict formal title
approach with the result that claims of hierarchical churches have been defeated. Merryman v.
Price, 147 Ind. App. 295, 259 N.E.2d 883 (1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 852 (1971); Serbian
Orthodox Church Congregation v. Keleman, 21 Ohio St. 2d 154, 256 N.E.2d 212, cert. denied,
400 U.S. 827 (1970).
45. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill.
2d 477, 501-03, 328 N.E.2d
268, 281-82 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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court noted that a "consideration of [the Mother Church and Diocese]
constitutions... does not in any way entangle this court in the determination
of theological or doctrinal matters. . . .Therefore, to hold that review is
precluded would leave the principle
expounded in Gonzalez and [Presbyterian
46
Church] without meaning.3
In the process of reversing the state court decision, the Supreme Court
clarified its position with respect to the Gonzalez "fraud, collusion or arbitrariness" exception. 47 While recognizing that Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Watson had made "references to the suggested exceptions," it
emphasized that Gonzalez was dictum only and in no case had the Court
"given concrete content to or applied the 'exception.' "48 In overturning the
state court finding that the defrockment was void because it had been arrived
at arbitrarily, the Court held "that whether or not there is room for 'margindl
civil court review' under the narrow rubrics of 'fraud' or 'collusion' when
church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes, no 'arbitrariness'
exception . . is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts
are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious
organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom or law. " 49 The Court reasoned that
the procedure necessary to determine whether a particular church decision is
arbitrary involves a civil court in an inquiry prohibited by the first amendment because the resultant inquiry would necessarily draw the Court into an
in-depth examination of church dogma, custom and law. The Court, in
Watson, had specifically rejected this approach as tending to "transfer to the
civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions."50
The Court classified the Serbian Church dispute as one which "essentially
involves not a church property dispute but a religious dispute" 5 ' even though
its resolution "affects the control of church property in addition to the
structure and administration of the American-Canadian Diocese." s2 This
classification is reminiscent of the Court's earlier approach in Kedroff where3
the dispute was considered "strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government""
rather than the more recent decisions of PresbyterianChurch54 and Maryland
& Virginia Elderships s which had classified the issue as a "property dispute,"
although all three cases involved similar disputes.5 6 This semantic change
46.

60 IM. 2d at 505, 328 N.E.2d at 282-83.

47.

See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.

48.

426 U.S. at 712.

49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 714 (emphasis in original).
Id.at 709.
Id.

53. 344 U.S. 94, 115 (1952).
54. 393 U.S. at 441. See notes 27-34 supra and accompanying text.
55. 396 U.S. at 367. See notes 35-42 supra and accompanying text.

56. That is, in all three cases, dissident ministers led their church's withdrawal from the
general church which then appointed a replacement to control the church assets.
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would seem to signal the demise of the neutral principles of law approach in
adjudicating disputes within hierarchical churches.
The Court specifically rejected the neutral principles of law approach
which the Illinois Supreme Court had attempted to apply: "The fallacy fatal
to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests upon an
impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals
...and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity .... ,,7
It held that the state court impermissibly reviewed the church constitutions
and penal code, rejecting expert witnesses and interpretations introduced by
the Mother Church. Moreover, it failed to recognize that the church
judicatories were also guided by canon law, which, although not always
consistent, is beyond judicial purview.5 8 The lower court's finding that the
Bishop's defrockment was technically incorrect (as it was not carried out
within the one-year limitation set out in the penal code) was also rejected
since the defrockment was justified by the church judicatory's decision. 59
Justice White, in his concurrence, observed that the major "predicates" of
the Court's decision were whether the church was hierarchical and whether
the Diocese was a part thereof, and that the majority's opinion should not be
60
read to suggest that these issues are not subject to judicial determination.
Thus, as in Maryland & Virginia Eldership, the6 Court may still find that a
claim to hierarchical structure is unwarranted. '
The dissent observed that the Watson finality rule was irrelevant to the case
at hand, in that Watson was decided prior to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins and
before the first amendment was applied to the states. "Such blind deference
[to hierarchical decisions] is counselled neither by logic nor by the First
Amendment. '62 Rather, the dissent reasoned that there was no difference
between the Illinois court's refusal to uphold the decision of the Mother
Church and the refusal of the Maryland court to do the same thing in the
Maryland & Virginia Eldership case. The dissent concluded that the Court's
rule as to the propriety of using neutral principles of law in settling church
property disputes compels "affirmance of at least that portion of the Illinois
court's decision" denying the Serbian Church the right to reorganize the
Diocese. 63 The notable weakness in the dissent is its reliance on the Maryland
57.
58.
59.

426 U.S. at 708.
Id. at 718-19.
2d 477, 487, 328 N.E.2d
Id. The ecclesiastical penal code was adopted in 1961 (60 Ill.

268, 273 (1975)) and therefore not extant when Dionisije attained the rank of Bishop and "signed
an Episcopal-Hierarchical Oath by which he swore that he would 'always be obedient to the Most
Holy Assembly' and that'. . . [slhould I transgress against whatever I promised here, or should I
be disobedient to the Divine Ordinances of the Eastern Orthodox Church, or the Most Holy
Assembly [of Bishops] I, personally, will become a schismatic . . . and become an alien to the
heavenly gift which is being given unto me by the Holy Spirit through the Consecration of the
Laying of Hands.'" 426 U.S. at 715 n.9.

60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 725 (emphasis added).
See note 36 supra and accompanying text.
426 U.S. at 734.
Id.
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& Virginia Eldership case which may be distinguished from the case under
review since all parties conceded the hierarchical nature of the Serbian
Church, whereas the hierarchical nature of the Churches of God was a
disputed fact and one not established by the Eldership."
Thus a rule emerges as to hierarchical churches that is clear and
definitive-the decision of a hierarchical church tribunal is final. Neutral
principles of law may not be used in the future to review those decisions
regardless of whether or not they can be shown to have been the result of
arbitrariness. Whether a church decision tainted by fraud or collusion may be
examined was left for a future decision.
Barbara Mailly Norman
64.

See note 36 supra and accompanying text.

